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I. FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most basic tenets of federal judicial law is that a federal 
court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case.1  Subject 
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by the U.S. Constitution or 
federal statutes.2  These sources provide two primary bases of subject matter 
                                                 
1. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (holding that “when 
a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 
complaint in its entirety”). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between 
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens 
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects. 
Id.; see also infra notes 3–6. 
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jurisdiction:  Federal question jurisdiction 3  and diversity jurisdiction. 4  
First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”5  Alternatively, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction 
over certain cases, based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.6 
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, some diversity cases originate 
in the federal district court, but others are removed by defendants from state to 
federal court pursuant to § 1441.7  Regardless of their origin, in order to rely 
on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the parties must demonstrate that 
they meet the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction found in § 1332, 
including the minimum amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.8  
Section 1332 provides specific jurisdictional requirements based upon the 
identity of the parties and whether a case is filed as a class action.9 
Although the diversity jurisdiction requirements appear to be 
straightforward—at least as they are presented in the statute—their application 
has proved to be more complex over time.10  An abundance of case law has 
developed regarding how the requirements for diversity jurisdiction should be 
interpreted; this Guide focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
interprets them today.11  Specifically, Part II sets out the statutory foundations 
of diversity jurisdiction.12  Part III addresses Eleventh Circuit and Supreme 
Court of the United States precedents regarding § 1332’s 
amount-in-controversy requirement, while Part IV analyzes the statute’s 
                                                 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
4. Id. § 1332.  Title 28, Section 1367 of United States Code provides that the 
federal courts, in some circumstances, may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims 
that are part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the courts have primary 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. § 1367; see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“Once the court determines it has original jurisdiction over the 
civil action, it can turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims in the action.”). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  For example, federal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334—bankruptcy proceedings, 28 
U.S.C. § 1335—interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1337—commerce and antitrust regulations, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338—patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1340—internal revenue and customs 
duties, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343—civil rights and elective franchise.  Id. §§ 1334, 1335, 1337, 
1338, 1340, 1343. 
6. Id. § 1332. 
7. Id.; §§ 1332, 1441(a)–(h). 
8. Id. § 1332(a). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)–(d)(4). 
10. See id. § 1332(a)–(d)(4); infra Parts II–VI. 
11. See infra Parts II–VI. 
12. See infra Parts II. 
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requirements for diversity of citizenship. 13   Section 1332’s specific 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction in the context of class actions are set 
forth in Part V.14  Finally, Part VI presents some specific legal rules that come 
up in appellate litigation of diversity issues.15 
II. STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND 
GENERAL RULES OF APPLICATION 
The starting point for federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction is § 1332.16  
In subsection (a), that statute provides the basic requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $75,000, 17  exclusive of interest and costs, and is 
between— 
(1) citizens of different [s]tates; 
(2) citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, 
except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction 
under this subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and 
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the 
same [s]tate; 
(3) citizens of different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state are additional parties; and 
(4) a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and 
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.18 
Subsection (d) sets out specific diversity jurisdiction requirements for 
class action lawsuits, which are different from those in other diversity cases.19 
More generally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”), provides the following requirement for pleading jurisdiction in 
                                                 
13. See infra Parts III–IV. 
14. See infra Parts V. 
15. See infra Parts VI. 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
17. Id.  The amount in the amount-in-controversy requirement has increased 
numerous times since the nineteenth century, and has been set at more than $75,000 since 1996.  
See id. § 1332(a). 
18. Id. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). 
19. See id. § 1332(d). 
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cases filed originally in federal court:  “A pleading that states a claim for 
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 
court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support.”20  Applying this rule, when a plaintiff 
files suit in federal court based on diversity, he or she must allege facts that 
demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.21  If a 
plaintiff’s inadequate jurisdictional allegations remain uncured, the district 
court is required to dismiss the case without addressing its merits. 22  
Dismissal is required because “once a federal court determines that it is 
without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”23 
Sometimes a diversity case is in federal court because a defendant has 
petitioned for its removal from state court.24  The statutory basis for removal 
of a civil action from a state court to a federal court is found in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any 
civil action brought in a [s]tate court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States 
for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending.25 
The burden is on the defendant to adequately plead diversity in a 
removal case.26  A defendant seeking to remove an action from state to 
federal court must file a notice of removal in the district court that “contain[s] 
a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of 
all process, pleadings, and orders” served upon the defendant in the state court 
action.27  If the defendant fails to demonstrate that the § 1332 diversity 
requirements have been met in a removed case, the district court will remand 
the case back to the state court.28 
                                                 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013). 
22. Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268–69; see also Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 
1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001). 
23. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). 
24. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (“A civil case filed in state 
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought 
originally in federal court.”). 
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 
27. Id. 
28. See id. § 1332; Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410. 
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Even if the parties do not dispute a court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
based upon diversity, federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject 
matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”29  The parties 
may not agree to waive subject matter jurisdiction. 30   As a result, the 
following legal issues may come up either by way of arguments raised by one 
or more of the parties, or because the federal court identifies a potential 
problem with diversity jurisdiction.31 
III. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY 
In civil actions—aside from class actions—there are two basic 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction:  (1) the amount in controversy must 
be more than $75,000; and (2) the parties must be completely diverse.32  This 
first section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit applies the 
amount-in-controversy requirement.33 
A. Burden of Demonstrating that Amount in Controversy Has Been Met 
 As stated above, the diversity statute requires that “the matter in 
controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
costs.”34  The party responsible for bringing the case to the federal courts 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the diversity requirements have been 
met.35  In a case originating in the federal district court, the plaintiff must 
allege in good faith a sum adequate to meet the statutory requirements.36 
                                                 
29. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410. 
30. Id.; see also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s 
competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise 
conferred upon the court by the parties.  Otherwise a party could work a wrongful 
extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied 
them.  
Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1000 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (holding that “subject-matter 
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited 
or waived”). 
31. See infra Parts III–IV. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). 
33. See infra Part III.A–F. 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
35. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411–12 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
36. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L.L.C., 329 F.3d 805, 807 
(11th Cir. 2003); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 
10
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In contrast, in cases removed from state court to federal court, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving diversity. 37   The defendant must 
“show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting jurisdiction.”38  
Applying this standard in removal cases, the federal court will show deference 
to the plaintiff’s damages allegations when pleaded specifically.39  However, 
when the plaintiff has not alleged a specific amount of damages, the court will 
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard.40 
B. “Legal Certainty” Requirement for Dismissal Based on Failure to 
Meet Amount in Controversy Requirement 
Federal courts “will not dismiss a case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the diversity statute ‘unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’ 
that plaintiff’s claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional amount.’”41  
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this standard “give[s] great weight to 
plaintiff’s assessment of the value of plaintiff’s case.”42  It is an objective 
standard.43 
In contrast, the court will not allow defendants seeking to remove 
cases from state to federal court to benefit from the legal certainty test.44  
Thus, where the plaintiff seeks less than the amount required for diversity 
jurisdiction, “only the sum actually demanded is in controversy.”45  In order 
to avoid remand in removal cases involving alleged damages below the 
statutory amount-in-controversy minimum, the defendant “must prove to a 
legal certainty” that the plaintiff’s counsel has either falsely or incompetently 
assessed the case.46  The Eleventh Circuit has stated that one way that a 
                                                                                                                   
(1938) (stating that “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in 
good faith”). 
37. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 
38. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. 
39. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 (stating that “plaintiff’s claim, when it is 
specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth”). 
40. See Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 947–48 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
41. Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 (11th Cir. 
1998) (quoting Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094) (emphasis added); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. 
Co., 303 U.S. at 289 (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the 
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”). 
42. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094. 
43. Id. at 1096. 
44. See id. at 1094–95 (noting that the plaintiff “is the master of his own 
claim.”). 
45. See id. at 1095 (emphasis added). 
46. Id. 
11
Landrum: Getting Your Case Into Federal Court: A Comprehensive Guide To Di
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
188 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
removing defendant could remain in federal court in this circumstance was if 
“he showed that, if plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the 
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible awards.”47 
C. Timing of Amount in Controversy Determination for Removal Cases 
Jurisdictional facts—including those regarding the amount in 
controversy—must be determined as of the date of removal.48  However, the 
court is not limited to jurisdictional allegations in the removal petition; it may 
also consider post-removal evidence of the amount in controversy, such as that 
presented in affidavits, if that evidence is relevant to the time of removal.49 
 
D. Calculating Amount in Controversy 
1. Law Regarding Aggregating Claims to Meet Amount in Controversy 
Requirements 
The law regarding aggregation of claims to meet amount in 
controversy requirements is complex and not always consistent. 50   This 
subsection sets out some of the rules regarding aggregation of claims.51 
a. Aggregation of Multiple Claims by Plaintiff(s) Against a Single 
Defendant 
As a general rule, a plaintiff may aggregate multiple claims against a 
single defendant in order to meet the amount in controversy requirements for 
diversity jurisdiction.52  In contrast, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that multiple plaintiffs’ claims can be aggregated, for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, only when “plaintiffs [have] unite[d] to enforce a single 
title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.”53  Thus, 
                                                 
47. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096. 
48. Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). 
49. Id.; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 
2001) (stating that “a district court may properly consider post-removal evidence in determining 
whether the jurisdictional amount was satisfied at the time of removal”). 
50. 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3704 (4th ed. 2011). 
51. See infra Part III.D(1)(a–c). 
52. Pearson v. Nat’l Soc’y of Pub. Accountants, 200 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 
1953). 
53. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper 
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973). 
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/2
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 189 
when multiple plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, the court will not 
aggregate those claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy.54 
b. Aggregating Claims Against Multiple Defendants 
When a plaintiff brings separate and distinct claims against multiple 
defendants, the general rule is that claims cannot be aggregated to meet the 
amount in controversy requirement. 55   The outcome is different when a 
plaintiff brings claims against two or more defendants who are jointly liable to 
the plaintiff; in that situation, the claims may be aggregated.56  Applying this 
rule, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not aggregate claims against 
two insurance companies when one company had primary liability and the 
other one had excess coverage of the same insured risk.57 
c. Aggregation in the Context of Class Actions 
There are additional specific aggregation rules in the context of class 
actions.58  For a complete discussion of those rules, see Part V.59 
2. Methods of Determining Amount in Controversy in Removal Cases 
The Eleventh Circuit has set out a specific approach to determining 
amount in controversy in removal cases.60  When the state court complaint 
seeks more than $75,000 in damages, “a removing defendant may rely on the 
plaintiff’s valuation of the case to establish the amount in controversy unless it 
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount 
claimed.”61  However, if the complaint does not contain a claim for a specific 
amount of damages, the federal court should consider whether “it is facially 
                                                 
54. E.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Dyess Furniture Co., 292 F.2d 232, 233 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (“The law has been . . . long settled . . . that when two or more plaintiffs, having 
separate and distinct demands, unite in a single suit for convenience of litigation, their claims 
cannot be aggregated to make up the jurisdictional amount.”). 
55. Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961); see 
also Cornell v. Mabe, 206 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1953). 
56. Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13; Cornell, 206 F.2d at 516–17 (“However, when the 
action is to recover a single tract of land and the several defendants claim under a common 
source of title, the matter in controversy is the entire tract of land and not its several parts.”). 
57. Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13. 
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
59. See infra Part V. 
60. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). 
61. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
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apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the 
jurisdictional requirement.”62 
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy is facially apparent 
from the complaint, “the district court is not bound by the plaintiff’s 
representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff is in 
the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought.”63  Indeed, the 
court may decide that the defendant’s evidence regarding the amount in 
controversy is more reliable than that of the plaintiff.64  The district court 
“may use [its] judicial experience and common sense in determining whether 
the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.”65 
“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the 
complaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require 
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was 
removed.”66  In order to sufficiently allege jurisdiction in the petition for 
removal, the defendant must do more than make “[a] conclusory allegation . . . 
that the . . . amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts 
supporting such an assertion.”67 
3. Determining Amount in Controversy in Cases Involving Only 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
In cases where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive 
relief, the proper measure of amount in controversy is the value of the object 
of the litigation.68  The Eleventh Circuit has determined that this value should 
                                                 
62. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010). 
63. Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061. 
64. Id. at 1061. 
65. Id. at 1062. 
 Thus, when a district court can determine, relying on its judicial 
experience and common sense, that a claim satisfies the amount in controversy 
requirements, it need not give credence to a plaintiff’s representation that the value of 
the claim is indeterminate.  Otherwise, a defendant could wrongly be denied the 
removal to which it is entitled. 
Id at 1064. 
66. Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319. 
67. Id. at 1319–20; see also Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 
(11th Cir. 2002) (“The defendants in this case have failed to carry their burden; all they did was 
to fill the notice of removal with the type of unsupported assumptions we have held to be 
inadequate.”). 
68. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see 
also Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 
218 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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be determined from the plaintiff’s perspective.69  If the value of the requested 
relief is too speculative or immeasurable, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the 
plaintiff fails to meet the amount in controversy requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.70 
4. Determining Amount in Controversy for Specific Performance Cases 
In diversity cases in which the plaintiff seeks specific performance of 
a contract, federal courts generally base their calculation of the amount in 
controversy on the value of the property at issue, not the amount that might be 
awarded in damages for breach of contract.71 
5. Challenges to Arbitration Awards and the Amount in Controversy 
Requirement 
The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide subject matter 
jurisdiction for a case to be in federal courts.72  Instead, a party seeking to 
challenge an arbitration award must demonstrate an independent basis for 
jurisdiction, such as diversity.73  In Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc.,74 the Eleventh Circuit held that “a federal court has subject 
matter jurisdiction where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award is also 
seeking a new arbitration hearing at which he will demand a sum which 
exceeds the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”75 
                                                 
69. Ericcson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218–20; see also Davis v. 
Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1999).  Note:  Not all circuits 
follow the plaintiff’s-viewpoint rule, although the majority have.  Ericsson GE Mobile 
Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218 n.8. 
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d 
at 222 (“Because [the plaintiff] cannot reduce the speculative benefit resulting from a rebid to a 
monetary standard, . . . there is no pecuniary amount in controversy.”); see also Morrison v. 
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “a plaintiff who bases 
diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctive relief must show that the benefit to be obtained 
from the injunction is sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the . . . amount in 
controversy requirement”) (quotation omitted). 
71. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Bullard, 995 F.2d 1046, 1047 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam).  “When the value of property sought to be obtained by specific performance 
exceeds the sum which might have been awarded in damages, the amount in controversy is 
established by the value of the property.”  Id. 
72. Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 431 F.3d 1320, 
1325 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
73. See Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1325. 
74. 431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). 
75. Id. at 1325. 
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E. Effect of Subsequent Events 
Subsequent events do not change a federal court’s analysis of the 
amount in controversy, as the court’s jurisdiction is determined as of the date 
that the case enters the district court.76  As the Supreme Court of the United 
States noted in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,77 the fact that 
the plaintiff does not ultimately recover the full amount alleged in the 
complaint does not void the federal court’s jurisdiction in a diversity case.78  
In explaining the good-faith requirement, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he 
inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court 
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.”79 
Applying this rule, a plaintiff’s stipulation or amendment of the 
pleadings after a case is removed to federal court that reduces the amount in 
controversy below the statutory minimum does not divest the federal court of 
diversity jurisdiction.80  Moreover, 
the fact that it appears from the face of the complaint that the 
defendant has a valid defense, if asserted, to all or a portion of the 
claim, or the circumstance that the rulings of the district court after 
removal reduce the amount recoverable below the jurisdictional 
requirement, will not justify remand.81 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, in determining the amount in 
controversy, it will not consider whether some damages may be precluded by 
the statute of limitations.82 
                                                 
76. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 293 
(1938). 
77. 303 U.S. 283 (1938). 
78. Id. at 289. 
79. Id.; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 
777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that, once the amount in controversy requirement 
is met “and the federal court is seized of jurisdiction, the court’s power is not conditional on a 
later award of at least that amount”). 
80. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292. 
81. Id. 
82. McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 The district court also found it significant that Maytag’s calculation of the 
amount in controversy did not account for the effect of any applicable statutes of 
limitations.  When determining the amount in controversy for jurisdictional 
purposes, however, courts cannot look past the complaint to the merits of a defense 
that has not yet been established. 
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1332 n.9. 
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F. Relevance of State Law to Determination of Amount in Controversy 
Although the question of whether the plaintiff has met the amount in 
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is a federal question, courts 
will often consider whether state law is relevant to that determination.83  
Specifically, the court will utilize state law “insofar as it defines the nature and 
extent of the right plaintiff seeks to enforce.”84 
In Broughton v. Florida International Underwriters, Inc., 85  the 
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a plaintiff could rely upon claims for 
statutory penalties and attorney’s fees, brought pursuant to a Georgia statute, 
to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for diversity 
jurisdiction.86  Although the court was willing to consider these types of 
claims, it ultimately determined that the defendant was not liable under the 
state statute and, therefore, the plaintiff did not meet the minimum 
amount-in-controversy requirement. 87   In Ericsson GE Mobile 
Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc.,88 the 
court also considered the availability of state-law remedies—this time under 
Alabama law—in determining whether the amount in controversy 
requirement was met.89 
IV. DETERMINING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP 
The following Part addresses in more detail the Eleventh Circuit’s 
analysis of § 1332’s requirement that parties seeking the federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction demonstrate diversity of citizenship.90  In fact, most of 
the court’s analysis regarding jurisdiction under this statute has focused 
primarily on this specific requirement, as explained further.91 
                                                 
83. See Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 
(11th Cir. 1998); Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352–53 (1961).   
[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction is a federal question to be decided under federal standards, although the 
federal courts must, of course, look to state law to determine the nature and extent of 
the right to be enforced in a diversity case. 
Horton, 367 U.S. at 352–53. 
84. Broughton, 139 F.3d at 863 (quoting Duderwicz v. Sweetwater Sav. Ass’n, 
595 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
85. 139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998). 
86. Id. at 863–64. 
87. Id. at 864. 
88. 120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997). 
89. Id. at 220–21 (holding that under Alabama law, if the plaintiff was 
successful it would only be entitled to rebid the contract and that the value of that benefit was 
too speculative to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.). 
90. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
91. See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. Rules Related to Pleading Diversity of Citizenship Exists 
1. The Rule for Cases Filed Originally in District Court 
a. Requirements Under FRCP 8 
When a party seeks to bring an original civil action in the federal 
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), FRCP 8 applies.92  Under FRCP 8, the 
plaintiff’s complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the court’s 
jurisdiction.93   Applying FRCP 8 in the context of § 1332, in order to 
adequately allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must provide specific 
allegations regarding the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.94  
Although the rule is straightforward, numerous legal issues can complicate the 
federal court’s analysis of the parties’ citizenship, as illustrated below.95 
b. Timing:  Diversity Jurisdiction Is Determined as of Date that the 
Action Was Filed 
In determining whether the district court has subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit looks to the facts as they existed at the time 
the action was filed.96 
i. Post-filing Changes in Citizenship Do Not Matter for 
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction 
It is well established that the only citizenship that matters for purposes 
of determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists is the original parties’ 
citizenship at the time the lawsuit is filed; any changes in a party’s citizenship 
that occur after filing are irrelevant.97  Thus, the district court will not “lose 
jurisdiction over a diversity [claim that] was well founded at the outset even 
[if] one of the parties . . . later change[s] [its] domicile.”98   Moreover, 
post-filing changes in the citizenship of a party cannot cure jurisdictional 
defects in a diversity action, where “[t]he purported cure arose not from a 
                                                 
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
95. See infra Part IV.A.1.b. 
96. See Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) 
(per curiam); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989). 
97. Freeport-McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 428; Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Kan., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) (“Jurisdiction once acquired on that ground 
is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties.”). 
98. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970), 
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change in parties to the action, but from a change in the citizenship of a 
continuing party.”99 
ii. The Substitution of Parties Under FRCP 25(c) Does Not 
Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction 
Diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse 
party to the action—accomplished by substituting the nondiverse party as a 
plaintiff under FRCP 25(c)—when the plaintiffs and defendant were diverse at 
the time that the action arose and at the time that federal proceedings were 
commenced; the substituted party “was not an indispensable party at the time 
the complaint was filed”; and the substituted party “had no interest whatsoever 
in the outcome of the litigation until sometime after [the] suit was 
commenced.”100 
iii. Permissive Intervention of a Party Under FRCP 24 Does Not 
Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction 
FRCP 24 provides for intervention of right and permissive 
intervention by other parties.101  The intervention of a party, by leave of court, 
does not destroy the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction when the intervening 
party’s “presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the 
original parties.”102 
Recent Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that an intervenor’s 
citizenship does have an effect on a court’s diversity jurisdiction analysis in 
some circumstances, however.103  In Flintlock Construction Services, L.L.C. 
v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C 104  a case brought pursuant to diversity 
jurisdiction, the intervenor was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff and 
sought to bring claims against both the plaintiff and the defendants.105  In 
order to maintain diversity jurisdiction, the court dismissed the intervenor’s 
                                                 
99. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2004). 
100. Freeport McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 426–29 (noting that “[a] contrary rule 
could well have the effect of deterring normal business transactions during the pendency of 
what might be lengthy litigation”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 
112, 118–19 (1894) (holding that the substitution of nondiverse defendants for diverse 
defendants did not destroy federal jurisdiction). 
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).  FRCP 24(a) provides for intervention of right, 
while FRCP 24(b) applies to permissive interventions.  Id. 
102. Wichita R.R. & Light Co., 260 U.S. at 54. 
103. See Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 
F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013). 
104. 710 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2013). 
105. Id. at 1222-23. 
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claims against the plaintiff but allowed the claims against the defendant to 
proceed.106 
iv. Plaintiff Cannot Later Amend Complaint to Add Nondiverse 
Defendant 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity jurisdiction 
is not destroyed by a federal court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over 
nonfederal claims involving impleader, cross-claims, or counter-claims, a 
court will not have diversity jurisdiction where a plaintiff later amends the 
complaint to add a nondiverse party.107 
v. In Evaluating Diversity, the Court Should Realign Parties 
According to Their Real Interests 
The plaintiff’s alignment of the parties is not determinative for 
diversity purposes.108  Thus, a federal district court, in determining whether 
there is complete diversity, has a duty to realign parties according to their real 
interests.109  For example, in shareholder derivative suits brought in federal 
court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the court will align the corporation as a 
defendant whenever the corporate management has adopted a position that is 
antagonistic to that of the plaintiff shareholder.110 
c. Curing Defects in Diversity Jurisdiction 
Under certain circumstances, it is possible to cure defects in diversity 
jurisdiction.111  The following subsection provides some analysis of when 
curing is possible and how it may be accomplished.112 
i. Courts May Use FRCP 21 to Drop Nondiverse Dispensable 
Parties 
“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, 
add or drop a party.”113  Thus, although generally diversity jurisdiction is 
                                                 
106. Id. at 1225. 
107. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1978). 
108. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941). 
109. Id.; see also City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “federal courts are required to realign the parties in an action 
to reflect their interests in the litigation”). 
110. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 96–98 (1957). 
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; infra Part IV.A.1.C. 
112. See infra Part IV.A.1.C. 
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determined at the time of filing, a jurisdictional defect relating to diversity of 
citizenship can be cured by the dismissal of a nondiverse dispensable party 
who destroyed diversity.114  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
warned that federal courts should exercise this power sparingly. 115   In 
determining whether to dismiss a nondiverse party, the court “should carefully 
consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of the 
parties in the litigation.”116 
Dismissal of nondiverse parties is not possible in all circumstances.117  
If the nondiverse party is indispensable, the court must dismiss the entire case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.118 
ii. Under Some Circumstances, Parties Can Cure Defective Allegations 
of Jurisdiction 
Parties may amend defective allegations of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1653.119  Title 28, Section 1653 of the United States Code provides 
that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in 
the trial or appellate courts.”120  The statute applies only to allegations of 
jurisdiction, however, and not to the underlying jurisdictional facts. 121  
Moreover, a defendant’s admissions as to his domicile—as well as record 
evidence regarding domicile—are sufficient to cure a plaintiff’s pleading 
defect when the complaint only pleaded the defendant’s residency.122 
Parties may also cure deficiencies in diversity jurisdiction allegations 
by submitting evidence of citizenship during case proceedings. 123   The 
                                                                                                                   
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 
U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to 
allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been 
rendered.”). 
114. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004); 
see also Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 827, 837–38; Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. 
Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011). 
115. Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 837–38. 
116. Id. at 838. 
117. See id. at 837–38. 
118. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1343. 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2012). 
120. Id.; see also Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.12 (11th Cir. 
2013) (allowing parties to submit supplemental materials to demonstrate diversity of citizenship 
in case removed from state court). 
121. Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 831 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1653 
“addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists, and not defects in 
the jurisdictional facts themselves”). 
122. See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342–43. 
123. See id. 
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Supreme Court of the United States has held that a federal court may consider 
record evidence in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 124  
Applying that rule, the appellate court “need not vacate a decision on the 
merits if the evidence submitted during the course of the proceedings cures 
any jurisdictional pleading deficiency by convincing [the court] of the parties’ 
citizenship.”125 
iii. Limitations on a Party’s Attempts to Cure Jurisdictional 
Allegations 
Although it is possible for the plaintiff to cure the jurisdictional 
allegations in the complaint, a federal court will not accept the parties’ 
stipulation that diversity jurisdiction exists.126  Furthermore, although a party 
may cure insufficient allegations of diversity jurisdiction by amending 
pleadings, a party may not cure them solely through self-serving statements in 
an unsworn brief.127 
2. Case Removed from State Court to Federal District Court 
As explained above, a defendant may also remove a case from state 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as long as he demonstrates that the federal 
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.128  As the Eleventh Circuit 
explained in Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,129 “[a] civil case filed in state 
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have 
been brought originally in federal court.”130  Similar to the diversity rules for 
cases filed originally in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit has developed a 
series of legal rules for analysis of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction in 
removal cases, as discussed further.131 
                                                 
124. See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 382 (1904) 
(stating “[t]he whole record . . . may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment 
of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of 
citizenship”). 
125. Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013). 
126. See id. at 1269–70 (stating “it is fundamental that parties may not stipulate 
to federal jurisdiction”). 
127. See id. at 1269 (noting that “we have never held that an unsworn statement 
in a brief, alone, can demonstrate a party’s citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity 
jurisdiction”). 
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 
154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
129. 154 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). 
130. Id. at 1287. 
131. See infra Part V.B. 
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a. Burden to Adequately Plead Diversity Is on the Defendant in a 
Removal Case 
Although the pleading requirements are somewhat similar in removal 
cases to those originating in federal court, the pleading requirements for 
removed cases are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), rather than FRCP 8(a)(1).132  
As explained further, the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of 
pleading diversity in a case removed from state court.133  As part of that 
requirement, the defendant’s notice of removal must include “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for removal.”134 
b. Specific Statutory Rules for Removal of Diversity Cases 
Title 28, Section 1441 of the United States Code contains additional 
special rules for diversity cases in the context of removal cases, as described 
below.135 
i. Fictitious Names (“Jane Does”) Are Disregarded for 
Purposes of Determining Jurisdiction in Removal Cases 
Title 28, Section 1441(b)(1) of the United States Code instructs that, 
“[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the 
jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . the citizenship of defendants sued under 
fictitious names shall be disregarded.”136 
ii. Exception When Defendant Is Citizen of State in Which 
Action Was Brought 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “[a] civil action otherwise removable 
solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . may not be 
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”137 
                                                 
132. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 
(11th Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A. 
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 
135. See infra Part IV.A.2.c. 
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); see also Walker v. CSX Transp., Inc., 650 F.3d 
1392, 1395 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011). 
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 
90 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 
When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts 
would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or 
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c. Time For Determining Whether Diversity Exists for Purposes of 
Removal 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), “[i]n a case not originally 
removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the 
post-commencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements—for 
example, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party—may remove the 
case to federal court within [thirty] days of receiving such information.”138 
The timing of a determination of diversity for purposes of removal is 
approached somewhat differently than it is in cases originating in federal 
court.139  In cases removed from state to federal court, the district court must 
look at the case at the time of removal, rather than the time of filing of the 
original complaint, to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.140  
Generally, the right of removal is decided by the pleadings, viewed at the time 
when removal is filed.141 
d. Curing Faulty Citizenship Allegations in Removal Petitions 
Faulty allegations of citizenship in a removal petition may be properly 
cured by filing an amended petition for removal in the federal district court.142  
Moreover, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly 
removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional 
requirements are met at the time final judgment is entered.”143  The Supreme 
Court has contrasted situations in which a jurisdictional defect remained 
uncured and situations in which there was no jurisdictional defect at the time 
that the district court entered judgment.144 
                                                                                                                   
defendants may remove the action to federal court . . . provided that no defendant “is 
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 
Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted). 
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68–69. 
139. Compare Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 
2002), with Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883). 
140. Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir. 
2007) (per curium); see also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002); 
Leonard, 279 F.3d at 972 (noting that “the critical time is the date of removal”); Poore v. 
Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by 
Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 2007). 
141. Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 253 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 
2001) (per curiam).  But see Gibson, 108 U.S. at 563 (holding that diversity of citizenship, 
when the basis of jurisdiction, must exist at the time of the filing of the original action, as well as 
at the time of the petition for removal). 
142. See D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 147 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
143. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 64. 
144. Compare id. at 76–77, with Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 
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Despite a federal trial court’s threshold denial of a motion to 
remand, if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect 
remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. . . .  In this case, 
however, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the 
District Court.  To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment, and 
return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional 
requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court 
system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted 
administration of justice.145 
e. Effect of Subsequent Acts on Diversity Jurisdiction 
“[I]f a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity 
action at the time of removal, subsequent acts do not divest the court of its 
jurisdiction over the action.”146 
B. Types of Parties 
Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh 
Circuit have further developed the requirements for how a federal court 
determines a party’s citizenship in the context of diversity jurisdiction.147  
The rules vary, depending on the type of parties.148  Those rules are analyzed 
further below.149 
                                                                                                                   
U.S. 377, 382 (1904). 
145. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 76–77 (citations omitted). 
146. Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining 
that changes to pleadings made after removal in diversity cases do not deprive the court of 
supplemental jurisdiction); Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 
1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 
2007).  But see Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that, 
after removal, plaintiff destroyed diversity by joining non-diverse defendant, but defect could 
be cured by dismissing non-diverse defendant). 
147. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010); Molinos Valle Del 
Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2011); McCormick v. Aderholt, 
293 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 
(11th Cir. 1994). 
148. Compare McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257–58, with Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 
80. 
149. See infra Parts IV.B.1–12. 
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1. Individuals 
a. General Rules 
The plaintiff is required to allege natural parties’ citizenship, not 
residence.150  As the court has observed, “[t]o be a citizen of a [s]tate within 
the meaning of [§] 1332, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United 
States, and a domiciliary of that [s]tate.  For diversity purposes, citizenship 
means domicile; mere residence in the [s]tate is not sufficient.” 151  
Furthermore, the federal court applies federal law, not state law, to determine 
a party’s citizenship under § 1332.152  For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 
“[t]he word ‘States’ . . . includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”153 
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a person’s “[c]itizenship is 
equivalent to domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”154  The court 
has defined a party’s domicile as “the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent 
home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of 
returning whenever he is absent therefrom.’”155  There is a presumption that a 
person is a domiciliary of the State of his birth, unless and until he acquires a 
new domicile, regardless of whether his parents were citizens of that State.156  
In order to demonstrate a change in domicile, a party must show both:  “(1) 
physical presence at the new location, [and] (2) an intention to remain there 
indefinitely.”157 
b. United States Citizens Living Abroad 
“[United States] citizens domiciled abroad are neither ‘citizens of a 
State’ under § 1332(a) nor ‘citizens or subjects of a foreign state’ and therefore 
are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court.”158  In determining 
                                                 
150. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342 n.12; Taylor, 30 F.3d 
at 1367 (“Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to 
establish diversity for a natural person.”). 
151. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
152. Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e). 
154. McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam). 
155. Id. at 1257–58 (quoting Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399). 
156. See Gregg v. La. Power & Light Co., 626 F.2d 1315, 1317 (5th Cir. 1980). 
157. McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258. 
158. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
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that a United States citizen domiciled abroad destroyed diversity jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court of the United States applied the following reasoning: 
In order to be a citizen of a [s]tate within the meaning of the 
diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the 
United States and be domiciled within the [s]tate.  The problem in 
this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no 
domicile in any [s]tate.  He is therefore stateless for purposes of § 
1332(a)(3).  Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt when a citizen of a [s]tate sues aliens only, also 
could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen.159 
Although Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain160 applied this rule 
in the context of a defendant, it also applies to a United States citizen living 
abroad who is a plaintiff to a lawsuit:  “A United States citizen with no 
domicile in any state of this country is stateless and cannot satisfy the 
complete diversity requirement when she, or her estate, files an action against 
a United States citizen.”161 
There is one important exception to this rule.162  “[A] citizen of a 
state does not lose her domicile when her employer sends her abroad,” or, in 
other words, when the citizen is living abroad “‘in the exercise of some 
particular profession.’”163 
c. Dual Citizenship 
There is also a special rule for individuals who have dual 
citizenship.164  The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “an individual who is a 
dual citizen of the United States and another nation is only a citizen of the 
United States for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”165 
                                                 
159. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 827–28 (1989) 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (case in which one defendant was a United States 
citizen living overseas); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3). 
160. 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
161. King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007); see also 
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828–29; Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“[A] United States citizen who is a permanent resident of a foreign country may not invoke 
federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 
162. See King, 505 F.3d 1171–72. 
163. Id. at 117–72 (quoting Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 423 (1853)). 
164. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
165. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). 
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d. Permanent Resident Aliens 
The district court does not have diversity jurisdiction of “an action 
between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are 
domiciled in the same [s]tate.”166 
e. Other Aliens 
For a full discussion of how other aliens are treated for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.167 
2. Corporations 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), “a corporation shall be deemed to 
be a citizen of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated 
and of the [s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of 
business.”168  Thus, “the complaint must allege either the corporation’s state 
of incorporation or principal place of business.”169  As demonstrated below, 
the interpretation of this statute has been more complicated in practice, and as 
a result, a number of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases provide 
further guidance for its application.170 
a. Domestic Corporations–Principal Place of Business 
i. The “Nerve Center” Test 
“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the place where 
the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation’s activities.” 171   The Supreme Court has observed that “in 
practice, [the principal place of business] should . . . be the place where the 
corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the 
actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ 
and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”172  
                                                 
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
167. See infra Part IV.B.12. 
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
169. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
170. See infra Part B.2.a. 
171. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010) (noting that some lower 
federal courts have referred to that place as the corporation’s “nerve center”). 
172. Id. at 93. 
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By taking this approach in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,173 the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected an approach to the “principal place of business” 
determination that measured the amount of business conducted within a state 
and compared that amount to the amount of business conducted in other 
states.174 
The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue in a 
published case since the Supreme Court decided Hertz Corp.175  However, 
prior to Hertz Corp., the Eleventh Circuit applied a “total activities” test to 
determine a corporation’s principal place of business.176  In MacGinnitie v. 
Hobbs Group, LLC,177 the court described the “total activities” test as follows:   
[The “total activities”] test combines the “place of activities” test 
and the “nerve center” test used by other circuits.  Under the “place 
of activities” test, the location of the majority of the corporation’s 
sales or production activities is its principal place of business.  
Under the “nerve center” test, the location of the corporate offices is 
generally the principal place of business. 
. . . . 
The total activities test requires a somewhat subjective 
analysis to choose between the results of the nerve center and place 
of activities tests, if they differ. . . . Where a company’s activities 
are not concentrated in one place, a district court is entitled “to give 
these ‘nerve-center’-related facts greater significance” in 
determining principal place of business.178 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz Corp., the Eleventh 
Circuit’s application of the “total activities” test to determine a corporation’s 
“principal place of business,” as the Court did in MacGinnitie and earlier 
cases, appears to no longer be good law.179 
                                                 
173. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
174. See id. at 93–95. 
175. See id.; cf. Holston Inv., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071 
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that, in Hertz, the Supreme Court “announced a simple 
rule wherein a corporation’s principal place of business is determined based on where the 
corporation’s ‘nerve center’ is located”). 
176. MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). 
177. 420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). 
178. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted). 
179. Compare Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 80, 93–95, with MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d 
at 1239. 
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ii. Application 
Applying the standard set out in Hertz Corp., the Supreme Court 
determined that the mere filing of a Securities and Exchange Commission 
form “listing a corporation’s ‘principal executive offices’ would, without 
more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center,’” and thus 
its “principal place of business” for diversity jurisdiction purposes.180 
The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to apply alter ego theory in the 
context of diversity jurisdiction; thus, for diversity purposes, the Florida 
incorporation of a subsidiary could not be ignored on the ground that the 
subsidiary was the alter ego of its non-Florida citizen parent corporation and 
that the parent’s California citizenship should be imputed to the subsidiary.181 
b. Domestic Corporation with Principal Place of Business Outside of 
United States 
There is a special rule for a domestic corporation whose principal 
place of business is outside of the United States.182  In Cabalceta v. Standard 
Fruit Co., 183  the Eleventh Circuit held that if “a domestic corporation’s 
world-wide principal place of business is not in one of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico, . . . then the foreign principal place of 
business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes.” 184  
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) was amended effective January 2012.185  
That provision now states:  “[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen 
of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the 
[s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”186  It is 
unclear whether Eleventh Circuit’s holding from Cabalceta is still good law 
after that amendment.187 
                                                 
180. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97. 
181. Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 1985). 
182. E.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
183. 883 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1989). 
184. Id. at 1561. 
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
186. Id. (emphasis added).  That statutory provision states a different rule for 
cases in which the defendant is a liability insurer.  See id. 
187. See id.; Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1561. 
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c. Foreign Corporations 
For jurisdictional purposes, federal courts treat the corporation of a 
foreign state as a citizen of that state.188  However, if a foreign corporation 
has its principal place of business in the United States, it is a citizen of the state 
in which its principal place of business is located.189  However, a corporation 
“owned by a foreign state is . . . deemed a foreign state for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction.”190  In that case, diversity jurisdiction will not exist unless the 
foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(4).191 
For additional discussion of alienage jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.192 
d. Corporations Chartered Pursuant to Federal Law 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1348, “[a]ll national banking associations 
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed 
citizens of the [s]tates in which they are respectively located.”193  However, 
the statute does not further define how the court should determine a national 
bank’s location.194  The Supreme Court has subsequently provided further 
guidance, holding in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt195 that “a national bank, for § 
1348 purposes, is a citizen of the [s]tate in which its main office, as set forth in 
its articles of association, is located.”196 
Prior to Wachovia Bank, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that a federal 
savings bank, as a corporation chartered pursuant to federal law, “would not 
be a citizen of any state for diversity purposes and diversity jurisdiction would 
not exist unless the corporation’s activities were sufficiently localized in one 
                                                 
188. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 
U.S. 88, 91 (2002). 
189. Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir. 
1984) (“[A] foreign corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it has its principal 
place of business.”); see also Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(determining that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), a Panamanian corporation was a citizen of 
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because its principal place of business was located 
in Florida). 
190. See Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 
1993). 
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542. 
192. See infra Part IV.B.12. 
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1348. 
194. See id. 
195. 546 U.S. 303 (2006), rev’d, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (2013). 
196. Id. at 307. 
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state.”197  However, after Wachovia Bank, the Court’s analysis in Loyola 
Federal Savings Bank v. Fickling198 should no longer be good law.199 
e. Dissolved or Inactive Corporations 
Circuit courts that have considered the issue are divided regarding 
whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has a principal place of 
business. 200   In Holston Investments, Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 201  the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for this issue:  “[A] dissolved 
corporation has no principal place of business.” 202   Thus, a dissolved 
corporation is only a citizen of its state of incorporation.203 
3. Unincorporated Associations 
Unincorporated associations are treated differently than corporations 
when it comes to citizenships analysis.204 
 
[U]nincorporated associations do not themselves have any 
citizenship, but instead must prove the citizenship of each of their 
members to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  Furthermore, no matter the particular features of an 
unincorporated entity, it has long been “[t]he tradition of the 
common law . . . to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups 
and to assimilate all others to partnerships,” which must plead the 
citizenship of each member.205 
 
Thus, an unincorporated association has no legal existence separate 
from its individual members, even if state law permits the unincorporated 
association to “sue or be sued in the association[’s] name.”206 
                                                 
197. Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603, 606 (11th Cir. 1995). 
198. 58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995). 
199. See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 317–19; Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank, 58 F.3d 
at 606. 
200. See Holston Invs., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing the various approaches to this issue used by other 
circuits). 
201. 677 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
202. Id. at 1071. 
203. See id. 
204. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1081, 
1086 (11th Cir. 2010). 
205. Id. at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 
288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)). 
206. Id. at 1091 (quoting Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 
1962)). 
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a. Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) 
With this standard in mind, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “a 
limited liability company . . . ‘is a citizen of any state of which a member of 
the company is a citizen.’ . . .  ‘To sufficiently allege the citizenships of these 
unincorporated business entities, a party must list the citizenships of all the 
members of the limited liability company.’”207  Applying this rule, it is not 
enough for the complaint to allege that an “[LLC was] created under the laws 
of the [s]tate of Georgia, with its principal place of business . . . in Scottsdale, 
Georgia.”208 
b. Partnerships:  General and Limited 
Similar to the approach taken for LLCs, for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction, a partnership’s citizenship “depends on the citizenship of each of 
its partners.”209  Accordingly, “a limited partnership is a citizen of each state 
in which any of its [general or limited] partners . . . are citizens.” 210  
Furthermore, when one of the partners is also a partnership, the district court 
should inquire into the citizenship of the second partnership’s partners as 
well.211 
c. Syndicates 
Syndicates—such as the underwriters associated with Lloyd’s of 
London—are required to plead every member’s citizenship, just like other 
unincorporated associations.212 
                                                 
207. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast 
SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); see also Flintlock 
Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013). 
208. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, LLC, 663 F.3d at 1305; see also 
Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 1224; Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021, 
1022. 
209. Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431, 433 
n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). 
210. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021; see also Carden v. Arkoma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990). 
211. Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co., 588 F.2d at 433 n.1. 
212. See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1088–89 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
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d. Unincorporated Joint Stock Companies 
Federal courts treat unincorporated joint stock companies as 
partnerships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and apply the same rules for 
determining citizenship.213 
e. Unincorporated National Labor Unions 
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that federal courts 
should not treat unincorporated national labor unions as corporations for 
diversity purposes but instead should look to the citizenship of the union’s 
members.214 
f. Unincorporated Business Trusts 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the citizenship of an 
unincorporated business trust is to be determined on the basis of the 
citizenship of its shareholders.215  However, the court has also stated that a 
business trust is neither a corporation nor an association, and therefore, where 
the trustees hold, manage, and dispose of trust assets for the benefit of trust 
beneficiaries, the court should consider the citizenship of trustees rather than 
trust beneficiaries.216 
g. The Exception:  Sociedad en Comandita 
As an exception to the general rule that the citizenship of an 
unincorporated association is determined by the citizenship of its individual 
members, the Supreme Court has held that a sociedad en comandita—an 
entity created under the civil law of Puerto Rico—could be treated as a citizen 
of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.217  In coming to this 
                                                 
213. See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889). 
214. See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 
U.S. 145, 147, 149–53 (1965). 
215. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 
1337–39 (11th Cir. 2002); Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R. 
Starnes Co. of Fla., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[T]he Trust Funds, 
which appear to be voluntary unincorporated associations, are not citizens of any particular 
state; rather, the citizenship of trust fund members is determinative of the existence of diversity 
of citizenship.”); Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(determining that, because trust funds were voluntary unincorporated associations, the 
citizenship of their members was determinative of the existence of diversity of citizenship). 
216. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 462, 463 nn. 10, 11, 
465–66 (1980). 
217. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933). 
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determination, the Court reasoned that the sociedad’s juridical personality “is 
so complete in contemplation of the law of Puerto Rico that we see no 
adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a different status for 
purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that 
law.”218 
4. Receivers 
In an action by or against a receiver, the district court should consider 
the citizenship of the receiver for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 219  
However, the case law distinguishes between situations in which a receiver is 
a proper party to litigation—and thus his citizenship should be 
considered—versus those in which he is not a proper party, and his citizenship 
should be ignored in diversity determinations.220  In the former, the receiver 
is a proper party because another party seeks to take property out of his 
possession or seeks relief against his acts.221  However, the receiver is not a 
proper party to litigation affecting parties’ rights in property not in his 
possession, or to litigation asserting rights to said property in his possession 
without disturbing his possession thereof.222 
5. Liability Insurance Companies 
a. Statutory Basis 
Section 1332 provides special rules for determining a liability 
insurance company’s citizenship for diversity purposes: 
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of 
liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to 
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such 
insurer shall be deemed a citizen of– 
(A) every [s]tate and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen; 
(B) every [s]tate and foreign state by which the insurer has been 
incorporated; and 
                                                 
218. Id. 
219. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1934). 
220. See U.S. Mortg. & Trust Co. v. Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co., 269 F. 497, 500─01 
(5th Cir. 1921). 
221. Id. at 501. 
222. Id. 
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(C) the [s]tate or foreign state where the insurer has its principal 
place of business.223 
b. Case Law Interpreting These Provisions 
The “direct action” provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) is limited to 
actions against insurers and thus is not applicable to a workers’ compensation 
action brought in federal court by an insurer.224  Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) 
“will defeat diversity jurisdiction only if the claim which the third party has 
against the insuredfor intentional tort, negligence, fraud, etc.is the same 
one asserted against the insurance company as within the zone of primary 
liability for which the company issued the policy.”225  As the Eleventh Circuit 
has observed, “courts have uniformly defined the term ‘direct action’ to refer 
to ‘those cases in which a party suffering injuries or damage for which another 
is legally responsible is entitled to bring suit against the other’s liability 
insurer without joining the insured or first obtaining a judgment against 
him.’”226 
In contrast: 
[W]here the suit, brought either by the insured or by an injured third 
party, is based not on the primary liability covered by the liability 
insurance policy but on the insurer’s failure to settle within policy 
limits or in good faith, the [§] 1332(c) direct action proviso does not 
preclude diversity jurisdiction.227 
In Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,228 the court explained 
that, “unless the cause of action against the insurance company is of such a 
nature that the liability sought to be imposed could be imposed against the 
insured, the action is not a direct action.”229 
                                                 
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
224. Id.; Northbrook Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 7 (1989); see also 
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 1332(c) 
does not apply to a “declaratory judgment action in which a liability insurer is the plaintiff”). 
225. John Cooper Produce, Inc. v. Paxton Nat’l Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 433, 435 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
226. Kong v. Allied Prof’l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157, 1159 (11th Cir. 1985)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
227. Fortson, 751 F.2d at 1159; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). 
228. 751 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1985). 
229. Id. at 1159. 
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6. Institutions of Higher Learning 
The Eleventh Circuit held that a complaint insufficiently alleged the 
citizenship of Tuskegee University when it stated that Tuskegee University 
was “‘an Alabama institution of higher learning, located in Macon County, 
Alabama.’”230  The court has also applied an Eleventh Amendment immunity 
analysis to determine that a state university was not a state citizen for the 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction.231 
7. Unincorporated Indian Tribes 
There is also a special rule for determining the citizenship of 
unincorporated Indian tribes. 232   As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, 
“unincorporated Indian tribes cannot sue or be sued in diversity under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because they are not citizens of any state.”233 
8. Estates 
“Where an estate is a party, . . . the citizenship that counts for diversity 
purposes is that of the decedent.”234  Thus, the legal representative of the 
estate is also deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent.235 
Note:  Prior to May 18, 1989, “federal diversity jurisdiction in estate 
cases was determined by looking [into] the domicile of the representative of 
the estate,” rather than the decedent’s domicile. 236   On that date, the 
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requiring courts to “look to the domicile of 
the decedent to determine diversity jurisdiction” went into effect.237  Thus, as 
to this issue, case law predating the 1989 amendment is no longer good law.238 
                                                 
230. Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
231. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
232. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607 
F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010). 
233. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012). 
234. Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); see also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 
1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Where an estate is a party, the citizenship that counts for diversity 
purposes is that of the decedent, and she is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which she was 
domiciled at the time of her death.”). 
236. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 668 n.3 (11th Cir. 
1991). 
237. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
238. See Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 668 n.3. 
37
Landrum: Getting Your Case Into Federal Court: A Comprehensive Guide To Di
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
214 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
9. Infants and Incompetents 
Section 1332 provides that “the legal representative of an infant or 
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same [s]tate as the 
infant or incompetent.”239 
10. States 
Special diversity jurisdiction rules also apply when a state is a party to 
the case.240  A state is not a citizen of a state for the purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction.241 
A public entity or political subdivision of a state, unless simply an 
‘arm or alter ego of the State,’ however, is a citizen of the state for 
diversity purposes.  Therefore, if a party is deemed to be ‘an arm or 
alter ego of the State,’ then diversity jurisdiction must fail.242 
When analyzing whether diversity jurisdiction exists over cases 
involving state entities as parties, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis to determine the citizenship of the 
state entities.243 
11. State Agencies and State-Created Public Entities 
a. Test for Determining Whether a State Agency Is a Citizen of a State 
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the following analysis to determine 
whether state agencies are “sufficiently separate and independent from the 
state so as to confer citizen status upon them” for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction:   
 
(1) whether the agency can be sued in its own name; (2) whether the 
agency can implead and be impleaded in any competent court; (3) 
whether the agency can contract in its own name; (4) whether the 
agency can acquire, hold title to, and dispose of property in its own 
name; and (5) whether the agency can be considered a body 
                                                 
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 
240. See Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973). 
241. Id.; Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir. 
1999); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983). 
242. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412 (quoting Moor, 411 U.S. at 717). 
243. Id.; Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318. 
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corporate having the rights, powers and immunities incident to 
corporations.244 
 
As demonstrated below, the Eleventh Circuit takes a case-by-case approach to 
this analysis.245 
b. Specific Examples 
i. State Universities 
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity analysis to determine that a state university was not a 
state citizen for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.246 
ii. A State Entity’s Board of Trustees 
The Supreme Court held—in a case in which the Board of Trustees of 
the Ohio State University was a party—that the complaint must allege the 
citizenship of each individual trustee because the board was not a corporation, 
even though under state law the Board had the power to sue and be sued, enter 
into contracts, and supervise lands and other property of the university under 
its collective name.247 
Taking a different approach, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the 
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of 
Florida was a citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because 
the title of the land in dispute was vested with the Trustees and “because the 
Trustees ha[d] acted . . . as a separate and distinct entity from the state.”248 
iii. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 
In Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. 
Davis, 249  the Eleventh Circuit determined that diversity jurisdiction was 
proper because Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 
“[was vested] with the power to sue and be sued and possessed other generally 
recognized corporate powers.”250 
                                                 
244. Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318. 
245. See infra Part IV.B.11.b. 
246. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412; see supra Part IV.B.6, 10. 
247. See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 213–18 
(1904). 
248. Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1316, 1318. 
249. 616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980). 
250. Id. at 833. 
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iv. State Bar 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the Florida Bar, having been 
explicitly created by and existing under the Supreme Court of Florida as an 
“official arm of th[at] court,” could not be sued in federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction.251 
v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans 
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Board of Commissioners of 
the Port of New Orleanscreated by state law, granting the Board all of the 
rights, powers, and immunities incident to a corporation and specifically 
granting to it various business powers, including authority to employ legal 
services and engage counselis a separate entity from the State of Louisiana 
for diversity purposes.252 
vi. Alabama State Docks Department 
The Alabama State Docks Department is merely the alter ego of the 
State of Alabama and thus is not a citizen of Alabama for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.253 
vii. Political Subdivisions, such as Municipalities or Counties 
“It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship, 
political subdivisions are citizens of their respective [s]tates.”254  Thus, “a 
municipality which is independent in character and function from the state 
should be considered a citizen for § 1332 diversity.”255  Moreover, a county 
may be a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction if, under state law, it has 
a sufficiently independent corporate character.256 
                                                 
251. See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195, 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1969). 
252. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 424 F.2d 764, 76567 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
253. Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 415 
F.2d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1969). 
254. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972), cert. granted, 445 
U.S. 926 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).  Other cases in which the Supreme Court 
determined that political subdivisions were citizens of a state for purposes of diversity include:  
Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 180 (1933); Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472, 
485–86 (1900); Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533–34 (1893); Lincoln Cnty. v. 
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer Cnty., 74 U.S. 118, 122 (1869). 
255. Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976). 
256. Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719–21 (1973). 
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 viii. Private Probation Companies as Officers of the Court 
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that private probation 
companies, as officers of the court, are governmental entities for purposes of 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). 257   Instead, private 
probation companies are private entities, in the same way that attorneys would 
not qualify as government entities.258 
12. Specific Diversity Rules for Aliens 
a. Statutory Basis for Alienage Jurisdiction 
Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code also sets forth 
specific diversity requirements for cases involving foreign citizens.259  First, 
the statute provides that federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction of a 
civil action that meets the amount in controversy requirement and is between  
 
citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except 
that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this 
subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same 
[s]tate.”260 
 
Second, it allows diversity cases to be brought between “citizens of 
different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 
additional parties.”261  Finally, the statute allows diversity cases to be brought 
between “a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and 
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.”262 
b. Case Law Analyzing Alienage Jurisdiction 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that aliens who are in the United States 
on non-immigrant work visas are not permanent residents for purposes of 28 
                                                 
257. McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)). 
258. McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242. 
259. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(4) (2012). 
260. Id. § 1332(a)(2). 
261. Id. § 1332(a)(3). 
262. Id. § 1332(a)(4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
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U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).263  The court has determined that the permanent resident 
alien provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) refers only to an alien’s official 
immigration status.264  Thus, an alien who resided in Florida for four years 
but had not yet attained official permanent resident status was not a citizen of 
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.265  The fact that an alien resides 
in the United States is not relevant for diversity jurisdiction; what matters for 
purposes of diversity is the alien’s citizenship, not residency. 266   In 
comparison, “an individual who is a dual citizen of the United States and 
another nation is only a citizen of the United States for the purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”267 
The Supreme Court has held that “the United Kingdom’s retention 
and exercise of authority over the [British Virgin Islands (“BVI”)] renders 
BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, ‘citizens or subjects’ of the United 
Kingdom under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”268 
c. Foreign States 
Where a foreign state is a party to a case, diversity jurisdiction may 
exist if the foreign state is the plaintiff but will not exist if the foreign state is 
the defendant.269  Suits may only be brought against foreign states pursuant to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.270 
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a foreign state is defined as 
including “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.” 271   Furthermore, the statute defines 
“instrumentality of a foreign state” as: 
                                                 
263. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 n.10 
(11th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
264. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1340 n.10. 
265. Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1348–50 
(11th Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 
266. Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1981). 
267. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(2). 
268. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 
U.S. 88, 100 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5 (1989); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 
& n.11 (11th Cir. 1993). 
270. Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1543; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1330 (1976)). 
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/2
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 219 
[A]ny entity— 
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in [§] 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws 
of any third country.272 
A corporation owned by a foreign state is deemed a foreign state for 
purposes of federal jurisdiction; thus, diversity jurisdiction will not exist 
unless the foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).273  In order for a foreign state to bring a diversity action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), at least one of the defendants must be a citizen 
of a state, and diversity jurisdiction does not exist if all defendants are only 
citizens of foreign states.274 
C. Complete Diversity Rule 
Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code “require[s] complete 
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”275 
D. Exceptions to Complete Diversity Rule 
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity, there are 
several exceptions to this rule, as discussed further.276 
1. Court May Ignore Citizenship of a Plaintiff that Has Independent 
Basis of Original Federal Jurisdiction Against Defendant 
Although the general rule is that diversity jurisdiction requires 
complete diversity, there is an exception to this requirement when a 
                                                 
272. Id. § 1603(b). 
273. Id. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542–43. 
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v. 
M/V Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987, 990–91 (11th Cir. 1985). 
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Wis. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 
(1996). 
 276. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; infra Part IV.D.1–8. 
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non-diverse plaintiff “has an independent basis of original . . . jurisdiction 
against the defendant.”277 
2. Court May Properly Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction When 
Non-Diverse Defendant Is Sued Under Federal Law 
Similarly, the district court still may properly exercise diversity 
jurisdiction “when the plaintiff joins a non-diverse defendant sued under 
federal law with a diverse defendant sued in diversity.”278 
3. Supplemental/Ancillary Claims Asserted Between Non-Diverse 
Defendants 
While it is true that a nondiverse defendant must be formally 
dismissed from the case to permit a subsequent removal, this in 
effect requires only that the plaintiff dismiss all his claims asserted 
against the nondiverse defendant and does not prevent the federal 
court from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim 
against a defendant or a cross-claim between defendants. . . .  Once 
a court has jurisdiction over a main claim, it also has jurisdiction 
over any claim ancillary to the main claim, regardless of the amount 
in controversy, citizenship of the parties or existence of a federal 
question in the ancillary claim.279 
The Supreme Court cases addressing this issue were decided prior to 
Congress’s passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
in 1990.280  That statute specifically provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly 
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which 
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall 
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 
the United States Constitution.  Such supplemental jurisdiction 
                                                 
277. Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 
1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
278. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508, 1511–12 (11th 
Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 
381 (1959). 
279. Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 
1988); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375–77 (1978) (holding 
that a diverse defendant could implead a non-diverse third-party defendant, but the plaintiff 
could not assert a claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant). 
 280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377. 
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/2
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 221 
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of 
additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded solely on [§] 1332 of this title, the district 
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) 
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the [FRCP], or over claims by persons proposed 
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to 
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent 
with the jurisdictional requirements of [§] 1332.281 
The supplemental jurisdiction statute appears to have codified the 
Supreme Court’s holdings with respect to these issues, and therefore these 
cases should still be good law.282 
4. Nominal Parties 
“[A] federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest 
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.”283  
Applying this rule, courts will disregard nominal, nondiverse parties in 
determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.284 
5. Statutory Interpleader Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 
Claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, applying statutory 
interpleader, require only minimal diversity; the plaintiff does not have to be 
diverse from the defendants, but at least two defendants must be diverse from 
each other.285 
                                                 
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(b). 
282. Id. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377. 
283. Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980); see also Bacon v. 
Rives, 106 U.S. 99, 104 (1882) (holding that the joinder of formal parties, destitute of interest, 
cannot oust the federal court of jurisdiction). 
284. See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Mfr.’s Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182, 190 (1924) 
(determining depository of a trust was a nominal party when it had no interest in the outcome); 
Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 437 (1903) (holding that corporate directors 
were nominal parties when the relief prayed for by plaintiffs against both a company and its 
directors was to be recovered from the company only); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 469 
(1879) (holding that the railroad was a nominal party for removal purposes after it resolved its 
dispute with the defendant and had no common interest with the trustee plaintiffs). 
285. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 
523, 530 (1967); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1957). 
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6. Class Actions 
The statute sets forth requirements of minimal diversity, rather than 
total diversity, for class actions brought pursuant to the federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction.286 
For further discussion of diversity jurisdiction and class actions, see 
Part V.287 
7. Total Diversity Rule and Alienage Jurisdiction 
a. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) 
In cases in which jurisdiction is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(2), the presence of aliens as both plaintiff and defendant destroys full 
diversity under alien jurisdiction.288 
b. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) 
There is an exception to the previous rule.289  Under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(3), the district court may have diversity jurisdiction over a case in 
which there are aliens on both sides of the actions, as long as there are also 
citizens of a state on both sides.290 
8. Removal Cases, When Non-Diverse Party Fraudulently Joined 
Although the district court generally will not have diversity 
jurisdiction over removal cases where the parties are not completely diverse, 
district courts still have diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff has 
                                                 
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 287. See infra Part V. 
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 
633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2011) (vacating judgment in favor of alien corporation against 
alien citizens because aliens’ presence destroyed full diversity under alienage jurisdiction); 
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the 
presence of at least one alien on both sides of an action destroys diversity”); Ed & Fred, Inc. v. 
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the rule 
of complete diversity was applicable to an action brought by an alien against a citizen of a state 
and another alien). 
 289. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). 
290. Id.; Iraola & Cia, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 860 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“It is a standard rule that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over cases 
where there are foreign entities on both sides of the action, without the presence of citizens of a 
state on both sides.”). 
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fraudulently joined non-diverse defendants in order to prevent removal.291  
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three circumstances when non-diverse 
parties have been fraudulently joined in state court. 292   First, fraudulent 
joinder exists “when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause 
of action against the resident—non-diverse—defendant.” 293   Second, a 
plaintiff may fraudulently plead jurisdictional facts in an attempt to avoid 
removal.294  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has identified a third example of 
fraudulent joinder:  “[W]here a diverse defendant is joined with a non-diverse 
defendant as to whom there is no joint, several, or alternative liability and 
where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the 
claim against the non-diverse defendant.”295 
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “‘[t]he determination of whether 
a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined must be based upon the 
plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits 
and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.’”296  The district court 
should approach a fraudulent joinder claim in the same way that it would a 
motion for summary judgment under FRCP 56(b), resolving disputed 
questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff.297 
With respect to the first type of fraudulent joinder, there is a fairly 
high hurdle for a removal attempt.298  In Coker v. Amoco Oil Co.,299 the 
Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]f there is even a possibility that a state court 
would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the 
resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and 
remand the case to the state court.”300  Thus, “[t]he plaintiff need not have a 
winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a 
                                                 
291. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). 
292. Id. 
293. Id.; see also Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
294. Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440. 
295. Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996). 
296. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001), 
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon 
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005)). 
297. Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). 
298. See Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440–41. 
 299. 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983). 
300. Id. at 1440–41. 
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possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be 
legitimate.”301 
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the third type of fraudulent 
joinder in the context of class action cases.302  This Guide addresses that 
analysis in greater detail in Part V.303 
E. Exceptions Where Court Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction Even if 
Diversity Is Established 
1. Probate Exception 
Under limited circumstances, courts will abstain from hearing a case 
involving wills and estates, even if there is diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 
the judicially-created probate exception. 304   However, this exception is 
narrowly construed.305 
2. Domestic Relations Exception 
a. General Rule 
The domestic relations exception divests the federal courts of power 
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees but does not ordinarily 
include tort claims. 306   Thus, even if the district court has diversity 
jurisdiction, the court will abstain from hearing a claim in cases involving the 
                                                 
301. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(emphasis omitted). 
302. See Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287–90; Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 
F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 303. See infra Part V. 
304. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 
666, 672 (11th Cir. 1991). 
305. See Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (“[F]ederal courts of equity have jurisdiction 
to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a 
decedent’s estate to establish their claims so long as the federal court does not interfere with the 
probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in 
the custody of the state court.”); Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 672–73; Mich. Tech. Fund v. Century 
Nat’l Bank, 680 F.2d 736, 737–38, 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that district court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over action against decedent’s estate seeking a declaration that decedent’s 
will conveyed certain assets to plaintiff, in spite of fact that there were pending probate 
proceedings and the federal court was required to interpret the will); DeWitt v. Duce, 599 F.2d 
676, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that a suit alleging independent tort claim for 
intentional interference with inheritance was properly before district court based on diversity 
jurisdiction). 
306. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). 
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parties’ domestic affairs.307  Speaking specifically to this issue, in Ingram v. 
Hayes,308 the Eleventh Circuit stated that “federal courts generally dismiss 
cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation[] rights, 
establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or 
divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.”309 
b. Limitations to the Domestic Relations Exception 
“The [domestic relations] exception . . . is to be read narrowly and 
does not—at least, ordinarily—include third parties in its scope.”310  The 
Eleventh Circuit has stated that courts should not abstain from cases related to 
domestic-relations law “when the following factors are absent:  (1) strong 
state interest in domestic relations; (2) competency of state courts in settling 
family disputes; (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in 
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state; and (4) the problem of 
congested federal court dockets.”311  Instead, “federal courts should dismiss 
the action only if hearing the claim would mandate inquiry into the marital or 
parent-child relationship.”312 
c. Examples 
In Rash v. Rash,313 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the domestic 
relations exception did not apply in a case disputing assets, specifically 
alimony, rights to pension, and real property, and which involved the question 
of which competing state decrees should be enforced.314  Similarly, in Kirby 
v. Mellenger, 315  the court held “that the district court [had] abused its 
discretion [in] dismissing [the] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” in a 
diversity case in which a former wife sued her former husband to obtain a 
                                                 
307. See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 308. 866 F.2d 368 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).  
309. Id. at 369–70 (determining that the district court properly dismissed child 
support arrearage claim because claim would require district court to decide the propriety of the 
Alabama state court’s order). 
310. Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), reh’g 
granted, 719 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1998); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 n.7 (observing that 
the third-party defendant in that case “would appear to stand in the same position with respect to 
[the plaintiff] as any other opponent in a tort suit brought in federal court pursuant to diversity 
jurisdiction”). 
311. Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441; see also Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370. 
312. Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370. 
313. 173 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1999). 
314. See id. at 1380. 
315. 830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
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share of his military retirement benefits not awarded under a Texas divorce 
decree.316 
The Eleventh Circuit’s precedent also demonstrates that a federal 
court may have jurisdiction over some issues but not others in this context.317  
Thus, in Jagiella v. Jagiella,318 the Circuit Court determined that the district 
court properly exercised jurisdiction over the former wife’s suit seeking 
alimony and child support arrears and properly refused to exercise jurisdiction 
the of former husband’s counterclaims for modification of the divorce decree 
by reducing his child support payments and increasing his visitation rights and 
for alienage of his children’s affection.319 
3. Violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1359:  Parties Improperly or Collusively 
Joined to Invoke Jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1359, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction 
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been 
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such 
court.”320 
V. SPECIAL RULES FOR CLASS ACTIONS AND MASS ACTIONS 
Plaintiffs may bring a class action in federal court pursuant to FRCP 
23.321  If the class action relies on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, it 
must meet the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.322  Specifically, 
§ 1332(d) provides specific rules for determining when a federal court may 
                                                 
316. See id. at 178–79. 
317. See Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1981). 
318. 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981). 
319. See id. at 564–65. 
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012); see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 
U.S. 823, 826–29 (1969) (holding that § 1359 prevents federal courts from exercising diversity 
jurisdiction in cases in which parties have been collusively joined, regardless of whether 
diversity was based on parties being citizens of different states or alienage jurisdiction); 
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the application of § 1359 in the context of transfers or assignments of claims and 
holding there is no presumption of collusion in determining whether diversity jurisdiction was 
manufactured in violation of the statute); Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1381 
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001), 
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon 
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005) (holding that fraudulent joinder of defendants could not be 
used to defeat diversity jurisdiction). 
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
322. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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exercise diversity jurisdiction in class actions.323  Many of the rules regarding 
diversity jurisdiction are different for class actions than for other diversity 
cases; and thus, it is important to look closely at the provisions in § 1332(d).324  
Furthermore, in many circumstances, case law decided prior to passage of 
CAFA,325 which revised the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class 
actions, may no longer be good law.326  CAFA sets out specific requirements 
for federal diversity jurisdiction in two types of cases:  Class actions and 
certain mass actions that qualify as class actions. 327   The following 
subsections analyze the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class action 
and mass action lawsuits post-CAFA.328 
A. Class Actions versus Mass Actions 
As stated above, CAFA applies to class actions and certain mass 
actions.329  A class action is defined as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of 
the [FRCP] or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.”330  The 
statute defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief 
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground 
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”331  For 
the most part, CAFA applies the same diversity jurisdiction rules to mass 
actions as class actions, going so far as to define a mass action as a class action 
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,332 except for specific circumstances 
analyzed in the following subsections.333  The Eleventh Circuit has observed 
that, “CAFA’s mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of 
interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.”334 
                                                 
323. See id. 
 324. Id. 
325. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)). 
 326. Id. 
327. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. 
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
 328. See infra Parts A–C.  
329. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2 § 4, 119 Stat. at 9. 
330. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
331. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
332. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“a mass action shall be deemed to be a class 
action removable under [§ 1332(d)(2)-(10)] if it otherwise meets the provisions of those 
paragraphs”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1199–1201 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 333. See infra Parts B–C. 
334. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1198. 
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B. Amount-in-Controversy Requirements 
As explained further below, CAFA sets out different 
amount-in-controversy requirements depending on whether the lawsuit is a 
class action or a mass action.335 
1. Amount-in-Controversy Requirements for Class Actions 
Class actions have a different amount-in-controversy requirement 
than other cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.336  Under CAFA, a 
class action brought pursuant to the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction must 
exceed the value of five million dollars excluding costs and interests.337  The 
statute explicitly states that each individual member’s claims will be 
aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.338  The statute does not 
require any individual class action plaintiff to assert a claim exceeding 
seventy-five thousand dollars. 339   Although CAFA’s legislative history 
suggests Congress’s intent that courts resolve doubts about the amount in 
controversy in favor of finding jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected 
that approach.340  Instead, the court has held that doubts regarding amount in 
controversy should be resolved in favor of remanding the class action to the 
state court.341 
Applying the same rule that applies in other diversity cases that are 
removed to federal court, when the plaintiffs in a class action have not pleaded 
a specific amount of damages, the removed defendant is required to prove that 
the amount in controversy meets the statutory minimum by a preponderance 
of the evidence.342  In those circumstances, the district court looks to the face 
                                                 
335. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (6) (setting out 
amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) 
(setting out specific requirements for mass actions that qualify as class actions under the 
statute). 
336. Compare the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with those set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
337. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
338. Id. § 1332(d)(6).  Prior to CAFA, class action plaintiffs were only allowed 
to aggregate their claims in limited circumstances.  See, e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 
410 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2005). 
339. Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam). 
340. See generally Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1327–30 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (discussing the legislative history of CAFA). 
341. Id. at 1329–30. 
342. Id. at 1330 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th 
Cir. 2001)); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 550 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2013). 
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss2/2
2015] GETTING YOUR CASE INTO FEDERAL COURT 229 
of the complaint, and, “[i]f the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent 
from the complaint, the court [looks] to the notice of removal and may require 
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was 
removed.”343  A defendant’s conclusory allegation in the notice of removal, 
stating that the jurisdictional amount has been met, is insufficient to satisfy 
CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement.344  In applying this rule, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant’s bare assertions that the amount in 
controversy in one case was similar to that in other cases that the federal court 
had jurisdiction over, without specific factual details, affidavits, or other 
evidence to support those assertions, was insufficient to establish the court’s 
diversity jurisdiction in CAFA cases.345  In contrast, the federal court may 
consider a defendant’s own affidavits, declarations, and other evidence in 
inferring that the jurisdictional minimum has been met.346 
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied the same standard for 
determining the amount in controversy when class action plaintiffs seek 
injunctive or declarative relief as the court does for other types of diversity 
cases.347  Thus, in South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,348 
the court determined that “the value of declaratory relief is ‘the monetary 
value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the [relief he is seeking] 
were granted.’”349  In the case of a class action, the federal court should 
therefore “aggregate the claims of individual class members and consider the 
monetary [benefit] that would flow to the entire class if declaratory relief were 
granted.”350 
Furthermore, in class actions in which a class has not yet been 
certified, a named plaintiff cannot stipulate that the class will not seek 
damages in excess of five million dollars in an attempt to avoid removal to 
federal court.351  In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,352 the Supreme 
                                                 
343. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319); see also 
S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (“What counts 
is the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”).  Like other removal cases, the 
calculation of the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases is based upon the time of 
removal.  See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751. 
344. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (citing Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320). 
345. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1210–11, 1220–21 
(11th Cir. 2007); Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752–54 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Lowery). 
346. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 755. 
347. See S. Fla. Wellness, Inc., 745 F.3d at 1315–16; supra Part 111.D.3. 
348. 745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014). 
349. Id. at 1316 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268 
(11th Cir. 2000)). 
350. Id. 
351. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 19, 
2013). 
352. No. 11-1450, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013). 
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Court explained that such a stipulation was ineffective “because a plaintiff 
who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed 
class before the class is certified.”353  The Supreme Court observed that this 
rule is different from non-class action diversity cases, where the plaintiff has 
the ability to legally bind himself through his stipulations.354 
2. Amount in Controversy Requirements for Mass Actions 
Title 28, Section 1332 or the United States Code sets out different 
amount-in-controversy requirements for mass actions than for class actions.355  
In addition to requiring total aggregated claims of more than five million 
dollars, the statute specifies that the federal court only has diversity 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in mass actions whose individual claims satisfy the 
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).356 
C. Diversity Requirements under CAFA 
1. Basic Requirements for Diversity 
Under CAFA, complete diversity of citizenship is not required.357  
Instead, the statute only requires minimal diversity for both class actions and 
mass actions.358  CAFA’s diversity requirements can be met in the following 
three specific circumstances: 
                                                 
353. Id. at 4. 
354. Id. at 7. 
355. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012) (setting out amount in 
controversy requirements for class actions), with § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that the federal 
court only has diversity jurisdiction over mass action plaintiffs who meet the amount in 
controversy requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). 
356. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(11)(B)(i).  The Eleventh Circuit considered this 
requirement in Lowery, but did not ultimately determine how the $75,000 amount in 
controversy requirement fit within the five million dollar amount in controversy requirement 
because the court determined that the defendant did not demonstrate that the removed action 
met the five million dollar minimum.  See id. § 1332(d)(2); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 
F.3d 1184, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). 
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C). 
358. See id.; Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip 
op. at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).  Prior to CAFA’s effective date, the Supreme Court interpreted § 
1332(a) to require that each named plaintiff in a class action be diverse from each defendant, but 
that standard was replaced by CAFA’s minimal diversity standard.  Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1193 
n.24 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921)). 
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(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate 
different from any defendant; 
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen 
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a 
[s]tate; or 
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate and 
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign 
state.359 
A class action also requires a minimum of one hundred plaintiffs, 
including named and unnamed class members.360  In contrast, a mass action 
requires a minimum of one hundred named plaintiffs.361  In Mississippi ex rel. 
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,362 the Supreme Court of the United States 
specifically rejected the argument that the numerosity requirement for mass 
action diversity jurisdiction could be met when a state filed suit as a sole 
plaintiff based upon injuries suffered by the state’s citizens.363  Moreover, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant may not attempt to combine two 
separate cases under the mass action provision by arguing that the cases 
involved common questions of law and fact, when the plaintiffs of those suits 
did not seek to consolidate their claims and each case, when considered 
separately, did not meet the numerosity requirements for federal diversity 
jurisdiction over mass actions.364 
2. Federal Court’s Discretionary Authority to Decline to Exercise 
Diversity Jurisdiction Over Some Class Actions 
There are certain circumstances when the district court may decline to 
exercise diversity jurisdiction in class action cases even when minimal 
diversity exists.365  This discretionary authority exists in cases where more 
than one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the proposed class members—as 
well as the primary defendants—are citizens of the state in which the action 
has been filed. 366   The statute directs the district court to consider the 
                                                 
359. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012)). 
360. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); see also id. § 1332 (d)(1)(D). 
361. See AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. at 5 (interpreting the 
requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)). 
362. No. 12-1036, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
363. See id. at 1. 
364. See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2013). 
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). 
366. Id. 
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following factors in determining whether to decline to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction in these circumstances: 
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or 
interstate interest; 
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the 
[s]tate in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of 
other [s]tates; 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks 
to avoid [f]ederal jurisdiction; 
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus 
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; 
(E) whether the number of citizens of the [s]tate in which the action 
was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate 
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other 
[s]tate, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed 
class is dispersed among a substantial number of [s]tates; and 
(F) whether, during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims 
on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.367 
3. Federal Court Must Decline to Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction over 
Class Actions in Certain Circumstances 
Title 28 § 1332 of the United States Code also sets out certain 
circumstances when the district court must decline to exercise diversity 
jurisdiction in class action cases, even when the minimal diversity 
requirements in § 1332(d)(2) have been met.368  Specifically, the district court 
will not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the following class actions: 
(A)(i) . . . a class action in which— 
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff 
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the [s]tate in which the action 
was originally filed; 
(II) at least [one] defendant is a defendant— 
                                                 
367. Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F). 
368. See id. § 1332(d)(4). 
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(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the 
plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the [s]tate in which the action was originally 
filed; and 
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any 
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the [s]tate in 
which the action was originally filed; and 
(ii) during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class 
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or 
similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of 
the same or other persons.369 
The Eleventh Circuit refers to this provision as the “local 
controversy” exception.370 
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that CAFA’s legislative history 
indicated “Congress intended the local controversy exception to be a narrow 
one, with all doubts resolved ‘in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the 
case.’”371  The party seeking to keep the class action out of federal court has 
the burden of demonstrating that CAFA’s local controversy exception 
applies.372  With respect to the first prong, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that 
plaintiffs’ designation of particular classes may make it difficult for the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class were 
citizens of a particular state, but that difficulty did not excuse them from the 
local controversy exception’s requirements.373 
The court has also provided some guidance regarding the second 
prong, known as the “significant defendant” prong.374  In Evans v. Walter 
Industries, Inc., 375  the Eleventh Circuit determined that the non-diverse 
defendant was not a significant defendant because:  (1) the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that the defendant was significantly liable for the damages 
alleged by the plaintiffs, in comparison to seventeen other co-defendants; 
                                                 
369. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 
370. Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006). 
371. Id. at 1163 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005)). 
372. Id. at 1164 (stating that “when a party seeks to avail itself of an express 
statutory exception to federal jurisdiction granted under CAFA, . . . we hold that the party 
seeking remand bears the burden of proof with regard to that exception”). 
373. Id. at 1166. 
374. See id. at 1166–68. 
375. 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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(2) the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendant played a significant 
role in the underlying actions that caused the plaintiffs’ damages; and (3) the 
facts showed that the defendant’s actions were primarily limited to a small part 
of the time period and geographical location at issue in the case.376 
The district court should also not exercise diversity jurisdiction over 
class actions when at least two-thirds of the proposed class members, as well 
as the defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action has been filed.377 
4. Statutory Limitations on a Federal Court’s Exercise of Diversity 
Jurisdiction in Mass Action Removal Cases 
Although district courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over 
certain mass actions removed from state court, the statute provides additional 
limitations for jurisdiction in that context.378  Specifically, § 1332(d)(11)(B) 
specifically bars the federal courts’ exercise of diversity jurisdiction in mass 
action removal cases under the following circumstances: 
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in 
the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in 
injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State; 
(II) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant; 
(III) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the 
general public—and not on behalf of individual claimants or 
members of a purported class—pursuant to a [s]tate statute 
specifically authorizing such action379; or 
(IV) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for 
pretrial proceedings.380 
Aside from these requirements, the same rules that apply to class 
actions originating in federal court also apply to removal cases.381 
                                                 
376. Id. at 1167–68 (stating that “plaintiffs’ evidence offers no insight into 
whether U.S. Pipe played a significant role in the alleged contamination, as opposed to a lesser 
role, or even a minimal role.  The evidence does not indicate that a significant number or 
percentage of putative class members may have claims against U.S. Pipe, or indeed that any 
plaintiff has such a claim.”). 
377. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2012). 
378. See id. § 1332(d)(11). 
379. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B).  The Supreme Court has referred to this provision as 
the “general public exception.”  See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 
No.12-1036, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). 
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV). 
381. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A). 
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5. The Defendant Has the Burden of Demonstrating that Diversity 
Jurisdiction Exists in Removal Cases. 
Although CAFA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended 
the plaintiff to bear the burden of demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction 
exists in removal cases, the statute is silent as to that issue.382  As a result, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that “CAFA does not change the traditional rule that 
the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of 
establishing federal jurisdiction.”383 
6. Timing of Citizenship Determination in Class Actions 
The statute directs the federal court to base citizenship determinations 
as of the date on which the complaint is filed.384  If the original complaint did 
not meet federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements, the district court 
should base citizenship determinations as of the date on which an amended 
complaint is filed, if the amended complaint then adequately pleads federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.385 
7. Other Special Diversity Rules in Class Action and Mass Action Cases 
a. Only Named Parties Considered for Diversity Purposes 
It is a long-standing rule that the federal court ordinarily considers, for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the citizenship of the named parties.386 
b. Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations 
Unincorporated associations are treated differently in class actions 
than they are in other diversity cases.387  “For purposes of [a class action], an 
                                                 
382. See id. § 1332(d); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005). 
383. Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
384. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7). 
385. Id. 
386. See Day v. Persels & Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, 624 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1980). 
[T]he rule that absent class members are not parties for the purpose of diversity 
jurisdiction “is . . . justified by the goals of class action litigation” because “[e]ase of 
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to consider the 
citizenship of all class members” and “considering all class members for these 
purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions. 
Day, 729 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002)). 
387. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10). 
59
Landrum: Getting Your Case Into Federal Court: A Comprehensive Guide To Di
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
236 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
unincorporated association [is] deemed to be a citizen of the [s]tate where it 
has its principal place of business and the [s]tate under whose laws it is 
organized.”388 
VI. APPELLATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION ISSUES 
A. Standard of Review 
Because jurisdictional questions are questions of law, appellate courts 
review de novo whether the federal court has diversity jurisdiction in a civil 
action.389  The court also applies a de novo standard to the review of the 
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1).390  However, the Eleventh Circuit reviews 
a district court’s jurisdictional factual findings regarding the parties’ 
citizenship for clear error.391 
B. Adequacy of Diversity Allegations 
When the pleadings were inadequate for the court to assess whether 
diversity jurisdiction existed, the Eleventh Circuit has “issued a jurisdictional 
question asking the parties whether the allegations of citizenship were 
deficient and, if so, whether amendment of the complaint was necessary.”392  
After determining that the plaintiff’s “allegations of citizenship were fatally 
deficient,” the court remanded the case to the district court for jurisdictional 
findings.393 
                                                 
388. Id. 
389. See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
390. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (amended 2007); Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. 
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010). 
391. See Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1085. 
392. Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1267–68; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, when the court could not ascertain whether the 
amount in controversy in a removal case was sufficient for diversity jurisdiction, it required the 
parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue). 
393. See Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268. 
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C. Requirement that Appellate Court Sua Sponte Consider Whether 
Diversity Jurisdiction Exists 
If it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is in question, the 
appellate court is required to sua sponte inquire into both its own jurisdiction 
and that of the district court whose opinion is under review.394 
D. Objections Based on Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Be 
Raised at Any Time 
A party can raise an objection to the federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction at any time.395  Applying this rule, the Supreme Court has held 
that, even after a party loses at trial, he or she may still move for dismissal 
under FRCP 12(b)(1).396 
394. Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999); 
see also Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that 
“federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of 
their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the 
parties either overlook or elect not to press”); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). 
395. Henderson, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5. 
396. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3) (amended 2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 
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